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Introduction
The standard economic model of accidents and liability, in its simplest form, assumes a world of homogenous populations of potential injurers and victims. Potential injurers are typically assumed to be identical, in terms of bene¯ts derived from the potentially harmful activity, of costs of care, and of wealth. The same happens with victims, who are also assumed to be perfectly interchangeable in all respects. Expositions of this simple standard economic model can be found in Shavell (1987) , and SchÄ afer and SchÄ onenberger (1998).
It is undeniable that in the real world many situations giving rise to accidents significantly depart from this restrictive set of assumptions. Both the injurer and the victim in a given accident may be drawn from heterogeneous populations of potential injurers, potential victims, and both. Some injurers derive larger, sometimes much larger, bene¯ts than others from engaging in an activity which might result in harm to third-parties. Some injurers face larger, sometimes much larger, costs of taking care and adopting precautionary measures than others. Some injurers are wealthier, sometimes much wealthier, than others.
These departures from the most basic set of assumptions have already been, to a large extent, substantially explored in the Law and Economics literature.
The heterogeneity of injurers in terms of their ability (and cost) to take care has been analyzed in economic terms, and the bene¯ts and costs of using general and average standards of due care instead of individualized and subjective standards have been duly examined in previous work: Landes and Posner (1987) , Shavell (1987) , Schwartz (1989) , Miceli (1997) ], Edlin (1998) . Similarly, wealth di®erences among injurers and their impact on liability rules have also been considered in the literature (Arlen (1992) , Miceli and Segerson (1995) ) 1 .
The issues arising from victims' heterogeneity have received a good deal less of attention in the literature. The source of victims' heterogeneity most extensively considered has been that related to the level of harm su®ered by the victim. Landes and Posner (1987) , Miceli (1997) , and specially Kaplow and Shavell (1996) , have analyzed the use of average versus individualized damage awards in the presence of heterogeneous victims in terms of their levels of harm resulting from an accident.
But victims, ostensibly, do not only di®er in terms of the harm they are likely to experi- 1 The use of Tort liability as a redistribution mechanism has also been extensively discussed in the literature, although with di®erent theoretical and policy goals in mind: Shavell (1994,2000) , Sanchirico (2000 Sanchirico ( , 2001 , and Avraham, Fortus and Logue (2002) .
ence if an accident takes place, but also in their relative ability and cost of taking care. For some types of victim, several (or many, even all) measures that may be adopted to reduce the likelihood of an accident are more costly than for other types of victim. Let's think, for instance, of children (although other examples are possible, and even likely) compared to adults. Taking care is, for most activities in which the participant might be harmed, more costly for children than for adults. Refraining from running on the sidewalk, watching for coming autos before crossing the road, using equipment with strength and ability, or resisting the temptation of trespassing on a premise that promises some excitement, is usually easier for adults than for children. For children under a certain age, and for some of those activities, even the most obvious precautionary measures can be prohibitively costly.
These di®erences in the costs of taking care carry over to the determination of the optimal levels of precaution. Other things being equal, the costlier the care for a given victim, the lower the optimal level of care should be. This is universally acknowledged by legal systems: The levels of care that legal systems require of minors are consistently lower than those required of adults. Even if still "general" or "objective", because they do not descend to the individual abilities and conditions of every single child, due care standard for a child is that of reasonable care not for an adult, but for a typical child within that age range. Evidence of this attitude across legal systems (both Common Law and Civil Law systems) can be found in Von Bar (1998) and Prosser and Keeton (1984) .
In a bilateral accident setting when care measures of injurers and victims are correlated (they are substitutes, for instance), the lower optimal level of care of a given group within the population of potential victims, increases the optimal level of care of the injurer. This issue of the interaction of victims' heterogeneity, on the one side, and levels of care of the injurer, on the other, in simultaneous choice of care situations, has been largely unexplored in the previous Law and Economics literature on these issues, who has, explicitly or implicitly, restricted its scope to unilateral accidents, strict liability, or both.
The goal of the paper is precisely to analyse the interaction between the levels of care of heterogeneous victims and the injurer under a negligence regime, and how di®erent legal implementation options can bring us close or far from the optimal levels of care for victims and injurer. The paper will be organized as follows: In section 2 we present the model and characterize the¯rst best and the second best. In section 3 we examine some of the basic implementation options using a negligence rule de¯ning due care levels. Section 4 analyzes the optimal solutions and implementation options when the injurer can observe the victim type with some positive probability lower than one. Section 5 discusses the major implications of the model for the application of the negligence rule and compare them with existing rules and doctrines in di®erent legal systems. We conclude by discussing the scope and implications of the model. All proofs are relegated to a technical appendix.
The model
We study the standard bilateral accident setting in which the behavior of a injurer and the behavior of the potential victim, a®ect the likelihood of an accident but considering that there are di®erent types of victims. In particular, we assume that there are two di®erent types of victims µ 1 and µ 2 : The ex-ante probability of type µ 1 is ®; and the ex-ante probability of µ 2 is 1 ¡ ®: We assume that all the actors are risk neutral and that it is costly for the injurer and the victim to take precautions. Let C(x) be the injurer cost of the precaution e®ort x. We assume @C(x) @x > 0 and
@x 2 > 0 . While the harm resulting from the accident is the same for the two types of victims, D, victim cost of the precaution e®ort y di®ers across types, C(y; µ). We assume µ 2 > µ 1 , and
and @ 2 C(y;µ) @µ@y > 0: Finally, the probability of accident depends on the victim precaution e®ort y and on the injurer precaution e®ort x; p(x; y): We assume @p(x;y) @y < 0;
@p(x;y) @x < 0;
> 0; and we assume that the injurer and the victim precaution e®ort are substitutes @ 2 p(x;y) @x@y > 0: We also assume that the legal system regulates behavior through the use of negligence rules implemented by Courts.
First best solution
We start by characterizing the¯rst best solution, in which the injurer can observe the victim type before choosing his precautionary e®ort. max x1;x2;y1;y2
The next Lemma shows, as expected, that the¯rst best solution implies that the less able victim (the one with higher cost of e®ort ) optimally exerts a lower level of care, which is fully intuitive given the higher cost of the µ 2 type of victim.
Given that, and as we are assuming that the injurer and the victim precautionary e®orts are substitutes, the next Lemma follows as an immediate consequence of Lemma 1. It states that at the optimum the injurer exerts a higher precautionary e®ort when facing a high cost victim.
Second best solution
In the second best solution the injurer can not observe the victim type, so he has to choose the same kind of precautionary e®ort with respect to both types of victims.
Similarly to the¯rst best solution, and due to the cost di®erence between the two, the next Lemma shows that in the second best solution the less able victim exerts a lower level of precautionary e®ort.
The next Lemma states that the second-best solution leads the injurer, as might be expected, to exert an intermediate level of precautionary e®ort. Moreover, this precautionary e®ort is increasing in the ex-ante probability of facing a less able victim.
Finally, given that the injurer exerts an intermediate level of precautionary e®ort and that the injurer and the victim precaution e®ort are substitutes, the less able victim increases his precaution e®ort while the more able victim reduces his precaution e®ort.
Notice that the less able victims are better o® in the¯rst best solution than in the second best solution since the injurer's e®ort towards them is reduced, and thus they are forced to increase care to make up for that reduction.
3 Implementing Solutions with the Negligence Rule
Di®erentiated negligence rule when the victim's type is observable
We start with the simplest case in which the injurer can observe the victim's type. In this case we will show that a di®erentiated negligence rule based on the victim's type can implement the¯rst best solution. A di®erentiated negligence rule sets two di®erent levels of care depending on the victim's type. This di®erentiated negligence rule determines that the injurer has to pay damages equal to D if an accident materializes and the precautionary e®ort of the injurer is lower than x i where i is the victim's type.
1 and x 2 = x ¤ 2 the di®erentiated negligence rule implements the¯rst best solution So, according to Lemma 6, if Courts are able to set due care levels at the optimal levels for each type of victim, the di®erentiated negligence rule can directly induce the¯rst-best solution when the injurer can observe the victims' type prior to the adoption of care.
Uniform negligence rule when the victim's type is not observable
When the injurer is unable to observe to which type belongs the victim he is facing, a di®erentiated negligence rule does not seem, in principle, an appealing alternative on e±ciency grounds. A uniform negligence rule can do the trick in this case. If the negligence rules sets a single required level of precaution e®ort x, which coincides with the secondbest level of care for the injurer, the second-best solution is attainable. Now we cannot achieve the¯rst best solution since the injurer can not observe the victim's type, but, as the next Lemma shows, the simple uniform negligence rule just mentioned can implement the second-best optimum.
Lemma 7
If x= x ¤¤ the uniform negligence rule implements the second best solution.
4 Imperfect Observation of the Victim's Type
The benchmark case
We consider that the injurer can observe the victim type with probability ¾, being this probability common knowledge. We assume that the victims do not know whether 
Notice that if ¾ = 1 this problem coincides with the¯rst best, while that if ¾ = 0 the problem coincides with the second best solution. The next Lemma characterizes the solution of this problem
The e±cient solution under imperfect observability is characterized by victims' intermediate levels of care (labelled y ¤N 1 and y ¤N 2 ) between the¯rst best and the second best solution. Given that, when the injurer observes the victim, he takes less care when the victim is a high cost victim and higher care when the victim is a low cost victim with respect to the¯rst best solution. Finally, when the injurer does not observe he chooses an intermediate level of care, similarly to the second best.
This solution can be easily implemented using a negligence rule when Courts can verify whether the injurer actually observed the victim's type or not. The optimal negligence rule has two cases, a) when the injurer has observed the victim's type the rule should be a di®erentiated negligence rule based on the victim's type, like the one that implements the¯rst best solution. This di®erentiated negligence rule sets two di®erent levels of care depending b) when the injurer has not observed the victim's type the rule should be a uniform negligence rule¯xing a single required level of precaution e®ort x= x ¤N N , below which the injurer would pay damages equal to D to the plainti® (the victim).
Injurer Opportunism
More realistically, in this subsection we will analyze the previous imperfect information set up incorporating unveri¯ability by Courts of the injurer's observation of the victim's type. In particular, the game that we want to analyze is the following:
1. Courts set levels of due care.
Nature decides the types of the victims and if injurers observe or not victims' types.
3. Injurers and victims choose the level of care.
4. The accident takes place or not according with the probabilities generated by the levels of care.
5. In the case of an accident, the injurer submits a statement concerning observation of the victim's type, and Courts decide liability based on the statement (according to the policies of trust and distrust described below), the victim's type and the negligence rule.
We solve this game by backwards induction. We look¯rst at the liability decision by Courts, then we analyze the choice of care, and¯nally we study the optimal levels of due care set by the Courts.
We assume that Courts could use a complex negligence regime comprising three levels of due care. A higher level of due care for injurers who observe a high cost victim x 2 , a low level of due care for injurers who observe a low cost victim x 1 , and an intermediate level of care for non-observing injurers x N . Therefore, in this scenario there is ample room for injurer's opportunistic behavior, given that he can observe a high cost victim and later pretend (something that Courts cannot tell if it is true or false) that he has not observed the victim's type, in order to exert a lower level of e®ort and save precautionary costs. What seems to be crucial in this setting is the policy that Courts follow concerning the credibility of the injurers' statements. We consider that Courts may follow two extreme policies:
1. A policy of complete trust towards the statements made by injurers and 2. A policy of complete distrust, whereby Courts never give credit to the statements by the injurer in those situations in which opportunism may play a role. Therefore, if the injurer claims that he did not observe the victim's type and the victim is actually a high cost victim, Courts would require compliance with the level of care corresponding to the high cost victim. In other words, under the policy of distrust, Courts will require for high cost victims the level of care designed for them, independently of the observability of the victim's type.
Policy of trust
Provided that Courts believe the injurer's statement claiming that he did not observe the victim's type, and the victim is a high cost victim, the injurer is not going to exert the e®ort required for the high cost victim when he in fact observes that the victim is high cost. Consequently, the injurer will never exert more than the intermediate non-observability required level x N . Thus, the injurers observing the victims' type, either low or high cost, have a dominant strategy: those observing low cost victims always choose x 1 and those observing high cost victims always choose x N .
Contrary to the conventional asymmetric information settings, the incentive problem of the injurer not observing is more complicated than that of the informed injurers. Given our previous assumption that Courts set (x 1 ; x N ; x 2 ) and depending on parameters of the populations, they can opt for three di®erent strategies exerting x 1 , x N or an intermediate level between both of them, x 0 (y); where
We characterize the conditions under which the uninformed injurer chooses among them.
1. The uninformed injurer exerts x 1 if the vector (x 1 ; x N ; y 2 ) satis¯es the following condition:
In words, the second part of the condition tells us that the injurer prefers to exert the low level of e®ort, x 1 ; and taking the risk of paying damages if he faces a high cost victim than to exert the intermediate level of e®ort x N (set by the Courts, and in practice the highest level of e®ort required given the trust policy) and thus, avoid paying any damages. The¯rst part of the condition excludes the adoption of an intermediate level of care between x 1 ,and x N . We denote by H 1 the set of vectors (x 1 ; x N ; y 2 ) satisfying this condition.
2. The uninformed injurer exerts x 0 (y) if the vector (x 1 ; x N ; y 2 ) satis¯es the following condition:
In words, the second part of the condition tells us that the injurer prefers to exert the intermediate level of e®ort, x 0 (y 2 ); and taking the risk of paying damages if he faces a high cost victim than to exert the intermediate level of e®ort x N . The¯rst part of the condition shows that given the injurer is liable towards high cost victims, he pre®ers to increase the level of care above x 1 to reduce the probability of accident.
We denote by H 2 the set of vectors (x 1 ; x N ; y 2 ) satisfying this condition.
3. The uninformed injurer exerts x N if the vector (x 1 ; x N ; y 2 ) satis¯es one of the two conditions:
In words, the injurer prefers to exert the intermediate level of e®ort x N set by the Courts, and thus, avoid paying any damages, than to exert a lower x 1 or some intermediate level between x 1 and x N and paying damages in case of accident with a high cost victim. We denote by H 3 the set of vectors satisfying one or the other of the above conditions.
These three strategies give rise to three di®erent equilibria.
The¯rst equilibrium is a partial pooling equilibrium in which injurers who do not observe the victim type pool with those observing the low cost victims. Then, the e±cient levels of care under this equilibrium, will be the solution to the following problem 3 .
Beside the incentive compatibility constrain this problem mirrors the problem in the benchmark non-observability case, with the additional constraint x N = x 1 : Thus, it is clear that the welfare now has to be lower than in the benchmark case.
The next Lemma characterizes the solution of this problem
The e±cient solution under this equilibrium (labelled in this case as NE) is characterized Therefore, this optimal solution clearly yields winners and losers compared to the benchmark case. Low cost victims and injurers facing high cost victims and observing them, both gain from the policy, whereas high cost victims and the injurers facing low cost victims and observing them loose. It is ambiguous the e®ect on the injurers who do not observe the victim's type.
The second equilibrium is a separating equilibrium in which injurers who do not observe the victim type choose and intermediate level of care between, x 1 chosen by injurers observing low cost victims, and x N chosen by injurers observing high cost victims. Then, the e±cient levels of care under this equilibrium, will be the solution to the following problem:
Note that x2 is absent from the maximization problem, given that injurers' opportunism replaces it with xN. The same applies to the following two maximization problems.
(
It would be tempting to think that with this separating equilibrium one could mimic the benchmark case, simply by choosing x 1 = x ¤N 1 and x N = x ¤N 2 . However, this outcome is not achievable since the uninformed injurers choose their privately optimal level of care, x 0 (y 2 ); taking into account just the high cost victims, the only ones for whom they are liable, and not all victims as in the benchmark case. Besides x 0 (y 2 ); the characterization of the optimal levels of this equilibrium closely resemble the previous case.
Finally, the third equilibrium is also a partial pooling equilibrium in which uninformed injurers pool with those observing the high cost victims. Then, the e±cient levels of care under this equilibrium, will be the solution to the following problem:
Since this problem mirrors the problem in the benchmark non-observability case, with the constraint x 2 = x N ; it is clear that the welfare now has to be lower than in the benchmark Therefore, the optimal solution under this equilibrium yields clear winners and losers compared to the benchmark case. Low cost victims and injurers facing high cost victims and observing them, both gain from the policy, whereas high cost victims and the rest of injurers (those encountering low cost victims and those not observing their high cost counterpart) loose.
One can also quite simply characterize the probability of opportunism conditioned on Courts receiving an unobservability statement by the injurer when the victim is high cost.
By the Bayes' rule this probability is equal to ¾.
It is unclear which of those equilibria provides a higher social surplus. It depends on the parameters of the population and on the probability of observation the victim's type.
On the one hand, it seems that if ¾ is large, then the probability of opportunistic behavior of the injurer is high and thus, the¯rst or second equilibrium are likely to provide a higher surplus. On the other hand, when the proportion of high cost victims is large, the third equilibrium is likely to provide more surplus since it avoids the ine±ciency arising from the uninformed injurer choosing the low level of care. 4 A complete characterization of the optimal solution would require assuming speci¯c functional forms. 5 We conjecture that this result can be extended to mixed strategies as well.
It is a general feature of most, if not all, legal systems, that some easily identi¯able cathegories of persons are subject to less stringent standards of due care than the average person. Probably the clearest example of this di®erentiated treatment is given by the standards of care to which children are subject. Given their lower psychological disposition and ability to take care, in order to comply with the requirements of the negligence rule, children don't need to adopt the precautions that the average citizen would take, but just those of ordinary kids of their age and experience. As the English case Gough v. Thorne 6 expressed:
The standard is that of \any ordinary child of 13 1 2 , by which I do not mean a paragon of prudence, nor do I mean a scatter-brained child, but the ordinary girl of 13 \When the actor is a child, the actor's conduct is negligent if it does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence and experience..."
In the Spanish legal system, also, the Supreme Court has consistently (or almost) denied that naughty, irre°exive, careless actions by children constitute negligent behavior that might be considered under contributory or comparative negligence rules. It is true, though, that some cases of reckless disregard of danger, let alone criminal conduct, by minors, have led to reductions or outright denial of liability due to contributory or comparative negligence: Ferrer and Ruis ¶ anchez (1999).
When, as it is usually the case, children (or other types of victim with higher cost of care) are the victims in the accident, how this a®ects the required levels of care of injurers involved?
Simultaneous accidents where victim's type is observable
In section 3 we showed that when the type of victim is observable by the injurer, the¯rst-best is implementable through a rule that imposes upon the injurer di®erentiated levels of due care depending on the type of victim: a higher level of care when encountering victims with higher costs of care, and a lower one when facing a victim belonging to the group having lower costs of care.
This kind of implementation mechanism is precisely what one observes in real-world legal systems through the use of the negligence rule. The negligence rule discriminates standards of care on the injurer's side on the basis of the type of victim, when the former is in the position to know the type of victim when deciding about the level of care.
Thus, for injurers dealing ordinarily with less able types of victims (children, physically or mentally handicapped persons) the standard of care is substantially higher than the one applied to injurers engaging in the same kind of activity, but ordinarily not interacting with those groups of victims. Just to give an example: the Spanish Civil Code and the Spanish Supreme Court apply very di®erent standards of care to educators dealing with minors (in primary or secondary institutions) than to University professors, who usually encounter young adults, but not children, in the course of their educational activities [Ferrer and Ruis ¶ anchez (1999), Durany (1999) ].
Even when the interaction with the type of victim having higher costs of care is uncommon, or merely casual, most legal systems still provide for enhanced duties of care correlated to the type of victim encountered, when the injurer observed, or could have observed, the victim's type. The injurer has to take additional precautions to counteract the lower level of care expected from that particular type of victim, and failure to do so would involve negligence and the corresponding liability for the harm caused to the less able victim [Seidelson (1981) , Prosser and Keeton (1984), Von Bar (1998)]. When children, for instance, are in the vicinity, their sometimes impulsive and thoughtless behavior has to be anticipated by the potential injurer, and thus, enhanced vigilance and caution is required to escape liability, enhanced care that would not be imposed upon injurers in the presence of an adult as victim.
This attitude is again consistent with the attainment of¯rst-best e±ciency in a world of observable victim's type. The fact that the injurer does not commonly encounter that particular type of victim, and that she is used to deal with other types of victim does not make the adoption by the negligence rule of a special and increased standard of care in these circumstances less attractive on e±ciency grounds.
Simultaneous accidents where victim's type is not observable
Things are more complicated, also in legal terms, when the victim's type is not readily observable by the injurer.
It is undisputable that the presence in the population of potential victims of some people having higher costs of care drives up the optimal level of care with respect to the level of care that would have been optimal in face of a homogeneous pool of victims. Most legal systems seem sensitive to changes in the likely composition of the pool of potential victims, and, at least partially, along the lines that the model presented in section 2 shows to be consistent with the pursuit of second-best e±ciency. For instance, the increased probability of the presence or proximity of children seems to push up the standard of care necessary to avoid being held negligent. Drivers are usually informed by adequate warnings that they approach a school area and thus, that the pool of pedestrians who might su®er an accident contains a higher fraction of children than the average neighbourhoods of the city. All legal systems require extra care from drivers entering an area covered by such a warning. In our model, it is e±cient to increase the required level of precautions when 1 ¡ ® (the fraction of high-cost victims in the population of potential victims) increases.
Similarly, when 1 ¡ ® a goes down in a certain setting, so does the optimal level of care on the part of the potential injurer, and so should the due care standard. For instance, when the pool of potential victims is less likely to contain children or other groups of highcost victims, the desirable level of care of those carrying on the eventually harmful activity decreases. This¯nding seems to give theoretical support to the adult-activity doctrine in
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7 . This doctrine operates as an exception to the general rule that children are subject to a di®erent and less stringent standard of care than adults. If children engage in so-called adult activities, they are held to the adult standard of behavior. In those activities in which typically one does not encounter children (say, driving, or motor-boat In some areas of the Law, one could advance the explanation that the attainment of the second-best is far from being the motivation behind the rules implemented by the Courts.
Even when observation of the victim's type seems hardly possible, Courts could still be using di®erentiated negligence rules based on the victim's type. So, when the person harmed by the defendant in a given case is a high-cost victim, the level of care required from the injurer under the negligence rule is the high level that was optimal for that type of victim (but not for the pool of high-and low-cost victims), whereas when the plainti® is a low-cost victim, the standard of care that the negligence rule would impose on the injurer is the low level that was optimal for that type of victim, but no for the pool 10 .
This attitude is particularly noticeable in the¯eld of tort liability of owners or occupiers 9 In the simple world of our model, liability rules were implicitly assumed to operate perfectly, and thus, the negligence rule, unaccompanied by contributory or comparative negligence, was able, on its own, to do the trick of inducing the e±cient levels of care both for the injurer and the victim. Since the direct implementation of the second-best in this setting dos not require paying attention to the levels of care of the victim. The reality that in the actual cases, though, there are no traces of the increased level of care of the high-cost victims, may be interpreted as indirect evidence of the fact that Courts are not trying to use a negligence rule that mimicks the direct implementation of the second-best. 10 Consider the limit case ¾ = 0 of the imperfect observation model developed in section 4. Assume that Courts use a di®erentiated negligence rule setting two required levels of precautionary e®ort x 1 and x 2 depending on the victims' type (there is no need for Courts to set a third intermediate level in this case).
Under this rule, the injurer would pay damages to the victim if the former is of type µ1 and x < x 1 or if the victim is of type µ 2 and x <x 2 . The injurer, however, can only choose a single level of e®ort since he can not observe the victim's type. Then similarly to the regular case, ¾ 6 = 0 , there are only three equilibria:
a) The injurer exerts x1and takes the risk of paying damages in case the actual victim is high cost, b) the injurer exerts x 2 and avoids paying any damages in all cases and c) the injurer chooses an intermediate level between x1and x2; paying damages in case the actual victim is high cost. Speci¯cally, these results hold when Courts use the¯rst best levels of care,
of land. The traditional Common Law rule is that landowners owe no duty of reasonable care to trespassers, and thus, if a trespasser su®ers harm as a result of the trespass, the owner or possessor will not be liable. The level of care of the landowner towards the so-to-speak "low-cost trespasser" is low (in fact, at least in principle, zero). The legal situation di®ers widely when the trespasser is a child. In this case, when the landowner knew or had reason to know that child trespassers were likely, the landowner owes a duty of care to the child Notice that in these cases, in order to impose upon the injurer the increased duty of care in front of the less able victims, Courts do not require observability of the victim's type (in most cases the landowner is unaware of the trespass), simply that the potential injurer knows, or has reasons to know, that there are high-cost victims. In other words,
Courts diversify the level of due care on the basis of the victim's type despite its apparent unobservability.
In is clear from our results in the preceding sections that this rule is less desirable on e±ciency grounds than a rule that simply and directly implements the second-best with a uniform level of due care for the injurer equal to the second-best optimal precautionary e®ort. But a case can be made for other factors alien to e±ciency justifying the use of the di®erentiated standard of care even for apparent non-observability of the victim's type. If the goal of the legal system is to satisfy some kind of Rawlsian preference in favor of the welfare of the less well-o® (here, by hypothesis, the group of victims with high costs of care), a di®erentiated standard for the injurer based on the type of victim actually encountered might, under the conditions referred to in note above, constitute an attractive policy alter-native.On fairness grounds, the use by Courts of a uniform negligence rule irrespective of the type of the actual victim encountered by the plainti® in the tort suit might be considered by many as unfair. One could argue that the uniform rule provides both injurers and victims with lower costs of care, with the opportunity of free-riding on the higher costs of care of other groups of potential victims. The presence of the latter groups allows the more able ones to save costs of care because they can anticipate that the potential injurer would adopt hundred percent of the times (remember, type is unobservable for the injurer) more precautions under the uniform rule, precisely due to the fact that there are less able victims in the pool. Injurers, on their part, incur costs of care with respect to all types of victims lower than the¯rst-best optimal ones with respect to the group of victims with higher costs of care. Moreover, the uniform negligence rule forces the latter group of potential victims to increase their levels of precaution, in anticipation of the lower care that potential injurers will adopt in front of the whole population of victims.
Specially if one considers the typical groups with recognizably higher costs of care (children, mentally or physically impaired persons), to many people, including many Courts, these e®ects might strike them as unfair. And some might even advocate that the welfare of these groups that specially deserve protection by society and by the legal system is well worth the price of some ine±ciency in the functioning of Tort Law.
It can be shown that in general, the use of a di®erentiated negligence rule based on the victim's type, although less than optimal in terms of the attaintment of second-best e±ciency, appears to improve in all cases the lot of the high-cost victims compared with the uniform rule immediately implementing the second-best optimum. 12 A di®erent kind of explanation, though, could be o®ered for the observed pattern of legal rules actually favored by Courts. This pattern is consistent with e±ciency if courts believe (and this not an unreasonable belief) that zero observability is impossible to discern from imperfect observability. Coupled with the fact that actual observation by the injurer in a given case cannot be veri¯ed by Courts, we are fully in the world of section 4 of the paper.
In this setting, we have shown that e±ciency calls for di®erentiated negligence rules, and that equilibrium behavior by injurers under this e±ciency-oriented di®erentiated regime would be undistinguishable from the one induced by the fairness-inspired negligence regime (though victims would take zero case in the latter but not in the former).
We don't have enough evidence about the motivations of Courts to use the di®erentiated rule in various accident settings, allowing us to conclude which is the most convincing explanation behind the use of di®erentiated rules by Courts in accidents in which observation of the victim's type seems hardly feasible. May be both of them are not mutually exclusive, and there is a combination of fairness and e±ciency forces leading to the observed choice of Courts in di®erent legal systems.
Extensions and conclusions
That potential accident victims are heterogeneous in terms of their costs of care is a fact of life. Some victims face higher costs of taking care than others. In the paper we have explored the implications of this heterogeneity for the functioning of the negligence rule.
In our approach we have opted for a model of two types of victim, di®ering in their costs of care. The extension of the model to a larger number of types would be trivial. We have decided not to extend the model with continuous types of victims, mainly for two reasons.
First, it would essentially replicate the¯ndings and implications of the discrete two-types model. Second, from a Law and Economics perspective, a continuous type setting would not adequately capture the actual perspective of the legal system, in which no consideration is given to each individual standard of care, but instead, broad (extremely broad, one could say, or even just one) cathegories are built in order to de¯ne standards of due care.
was anyway close to zero (which seems plausible for certain accidents settings given the cost functions of at least some groups of less able victims), the ine±ciency arising from the di®erentiated rule is relatively small, and might, at least by some, be considered an a®ordable price to pay in order to maximize the welfare of children or other disadvantaged groups of potential victims.
In the Law, standards of care are always general and average, and not made-to-measure.
Information costs would be otherwise intractable [Landes and Posner (1987) ].
Our model is also built upon the assumption that there is substitutability between care by victims and injurers. This is the standard assumption in the Law and Economics literature on bilateral accidents. It could be possible to extend our model to the case of complementary between the corresponding care e®orts of injurers and victims. The basic results of our model would then be reversed, because it would be optimal for injurers to exercise more care with respect to low-cost than with respect to high-cost victims. We believe, though, that the complementary case is of little relevance for the operation of liability rules.
To summarize the main results of our paper: we characterize¯rst-best e±cient levels of care for the injurer and both types of victims. We also characterize the second-best levels of care, which cannot be improved when injurers cannot observe the victim's type when deciding about the level of precaution the will adopt. Turning to the e®ects of the negligence rule on the adoption of care, we consider a uniform and a di®erentiated (based on the actual victim's cost of care) negligence rules, both of which seem to be in use in di®erent legal systems. When the injurer can observe the victim's type,¯rst-best results can be achieved using a di®erentiated rule. When this is not the case, a uniform negligence rule with due care set at the second-best optimal care for the injurer implements the second-best. The di®erentiated rule cannot do the trick, and is thus less e±cient than the uniform rule in an unobservable victim's type situation. We also analyze imperfect (as distinct from perfect or none at all) observation of the victim's type. We characterize the optimal solution in this setting, and examine the di®erent legal alternatives when Courts cannot verify the injurers' statements concerning whether they had or not observed the victim before taking care.
Counterintuitively, we show that there is no di®erence at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and a rule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements.
We¯nally discuss the actual use of several rules and doctrines in various legal systems, employing the results of the model as our theoretical framework. Speci¯cally, we discuss how the departure from e±ciency through the use of the di®erentiated rule in situations of practically unobservable type might respond to a preference for the welfare of high-cost victims at the expense of second-best e±ciency, or might be consistent with e±ciency tied to our results in the imperfect observability setting.
Proof of Lemma 1
Adding up the two equations and simplifying, we obtain:
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
From the previous Lemma we know that
For the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 4
The¯rst order condition of x ¤¤ is
This is because, In this case, the injurer is not liable and consequently he has not to compensate the victim for any harm. Therefore, the injurer will never choose a precaution e®ort larger than x ¤ i when he observes that the type of the victim is i: If the injurer exerts a precaution e®ort of x ¤ i , the optimal response of the victim will be y Now we show that the injurer prefer the case 1 to the case 2. This is because, the¯rst best solution maximizes the total surplus, and with the¯rst best the victim is worse o® (he has an expected cost of ¡p(x ¤ i ; y ¤ i )D ¡ C(y ¤ i ; µ i )) than in the case in which x DL i < x ¤ i (the victim has not to bear any cost). Therefore, if the total surplus is larger in the¯rst best solution and the surplus of the victim is lower necessarily the injurer has larger surplus with the¯rst best solution.
Proof of Lemma 7
We denote by x L the precaution e®ort of the injurer: There two cases 1. First, we consider that x L¸x¤¤ : In this case, the injurer is not liable and consequently he has not to compensate the victim for any harm. Therefore, the injurer will never choose an precaution e®ort larger than x ¤¤ : If the injurer exerts an precaution e®ort of x ¤¤ , the optimal response of the victim will be y L i 2 arg maxf¡p(x ¤¤ ; y i )D ¡C(y i ; µ i )g . The solution of this problem coincides with the second best solution, y L 1 = y ¤¤ 1 and y L 2 = y ¤¤ 2 :
2. Assume now that, the injurer chooses x L < x ¤¤ . In this case, the victim optimal response is y L i = 0 since in case of accident he will be compensated by the injurer. Then in case of x L < x ¤¤ ; the optimal response of the injurer us x L = x 0 , where
Now we show that the injurer prefer the case 1 to the case 2. This is because, the second best solution maximizes the total surplus, and with the second best the victim is worse o® (he has an expected cost of ¡p(x ¤¤ ; y ¤¤ i )D ¡ C(y ¤¤ i ; µ i )) than in the case in which x L < x ¤¤ (the victim has not to bear any cost). Therefore, if the total surplus is larger in the second best solution and the surplus of the victim is lower necessarily the injurer has larger surplus with the second best solution.
Proof of Lemma 8
For the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 1, y ¤N For similar arguments to the ones used in the proof of Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 10
For similar arguments to the ones used in the proof of Lemma 8.
